I have been concerned for some time about the changing nature of the United States economy and the structure of the United States labor market. There seems to be a tremendous mis-match between the two and this portends an unhappy near term for economic growth and employment.

An article in the Monday New York Times by Peter Goodman, “After Job Training, Still Scrambling for a Job” captures the whole dilemma (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/business/19training.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=peter%20goodman&st=cse). In this article, Mr. Goodman presents a well-developed argument that even after job training, many people in today’s economy cannot find jobs. One of the individuals Mr. Goodman interviewed stated in extreme frustration, “Training was fruitless. I’m not seeing the benefits. Training for what? No one’s hiring.”

Yet, Mr. Goodman argues that some industries are hiring. Some experts point out that “even with near double-digit unemployment, some jobs lie vacant, awaiting workers with adequate skills.”

“’There’s plenty of jobs in health care, in technology,’ said Fred Dedrick, executive director of the National Fund for Workforce Solutions.

Some of the aggregate figures point up this mis-match between labor and industry. First, the capacity utilization figures tell a dismal tale. Since the 1960s, capacity utilization in the United States has fallen. Every cyclical peak of capacity utilization over the past fifty years has been lower than the previous one. In the 1990s, capacity utilization reached a peak of around 85%; in the middle 2000s, the peak was around 82%; and currently it is languishing around 74%. United States industry does not seem to be “tooled-up” for the right output.

Second, the under-employment of the working-age labor force has grown constantly over the past thirty years or so. The “measured” rate of unemployment indicates that about one out of every ten workers is currently unemployed. My estimate for the under-employed is that about one out of every four workers is under-employed in today’s economy.

How did we get this way?

I believe that the economic policies of the United States government helped to create this employment situation!

The reason I give for this conclusion is that every time economic growth started to slow over the past fifty years, the federal government stepped in to stimulate the economy and put people back into the jobs they had just lost. This was the Keynesian approach to the problem of unemployment.

This approach to stimulating the economy worked well in the short-run but in the longer-run failed to take account of shifting technologies and the job skills of the work force. This mis-match did not show up so much in the short-run because, especially in the earlier years, technology was not changing rapidly. However, as the last fifty years moved along changes in technology occurred at a faster and faster pace. The dislocation between the new technology and the “legacy” industrial capacity in place grew, as did the chasm between many in the labor force and the skills needed to handle the new technology in the new industries being created.

This is an unusual happening for it is nothing more than the working out of Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “Creative Destruction”.

Applying Keynesian fiscal stimulus to this problem over and over again just exacerbated the situation. Why? Because people were either put back into “legacy” jobs or were given minor training and shoved back into the job market. Goodman writes, “Most job training is financed through the federal Workforce Investment Act, which was written in 1998—a time when hiring was extraordinarily robust. Then simply teaching jobless people how to use computers and write résumés put them on a path to paychecks.”

Goodman quotes Labor economist Carl E. Van Horn: “A lot of the training programs that we have in this country were designed for a kind of quick turnaround economy, as opposed to the entrenched structural challenges of today.”

The conclusion to this story is that over time the continued application of these Keynesian stimulus efforts causes a loss in impact. Each cycle this policy prescription seems to be less and less effective as the cumulative effect on industrial capacity and human capital grows. Capacity utilization declines and more and more workers become under-employed.

Given this conclusion, one can ask whether or not there comes a time when the fiscal stimulus program becomes almost totally ineffective? Have we reached a point where the cost/benefit tradeoff of more fiscal stimulus becomes almost all cost and very little benefit?

This, however, is not the only point that needs to be mentioned at this time. Most of the advocates of Keynesian fiscal stimulus policies are very concerned about the growth in income and wealth inequality over the past thirty years or so. The continued application of Keynesian-type fiscal stimulus packages during the past fifty years, I believe, has contributed substantially to the greater inequality in income and wealth that has occurred in the United States.

There are three primary reasons for this growth in inequality. First, the fiscal stimulus programs put people back to work in the jobs that they formerly held. The largest number of the short-term unemployed came from large firms so that the stimulus had to encourage the growth of these companies so that the workers that were laid off could be re-hired. The fiscal stimulus packages “subsidized” the growth and wealth of the big, already implanted companies. Thus, the salaries and employment packages in these areas could continue to grow over time even as the capacity utilization in these industries continued to fall.

Second, as more and more people in these industries became under-employed, their incomes dropped relative to other sectors of the economy and their future prospects also fell. This, however, did not keep these people from piling up debts to buy cars and houses and other consumer items. These people felt confident that over time, they would continue to generate income, even if it might be somewhat sporadic. Furthermore, the inflationary environment of the past fifty years made it sensible for these people to go into debt for the inflation depreciated the value of their debt over time.

Third, the wealthier segment of the economy took advantage of the continued fiscal stimulus of the past fifty years (gross federal debt rose at a compound rate of seven percent every year) and the fact that, on average, inflation rose at a compound rate of more than four percent per year over this time period. Wealthier people have always been able to position themselves better than the less-wealthy, especially when macro-trends become as predictable as the economic policy proscriptions of the United States government, whether Republican or Democrat.

Furthermore, wealthier people have always been able to find their way into the professions that provide, over time, the greatest opportunities to earn income and create wealth. Certainly these professions would include medicine and health, legal, finance, and management some of the biggest gainers over the past fifty years.

Given these factors, how long will it take for the United States economy to re-structure itself? In the 1930s it took a long time. Will it take that long this time around?